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ABSTRACT
There are very few, if any, published accounts of practical expe­
rience with Speaker Verification as a means to provide secure 
access to telematics services. Yet, there is no reason to expect 
that Speaker Verification is very different from speech recogni­
tion, for which many deployed services have shown the need for 
close and intensive on-line monitoring during the time when the 
service becomes operational. In this paper we present our expe­
rience with a monitoring scheme for Speaker Verification dur­
ing the field test of a financial investment game. Many of the 
issues that were monitored were suggested by our experience 
with a semi-operational service, viz. free access to Directory 
Assistance for visually impaired. A newly developed enrolment 
procedure, that can flag potentially weak speaker models, is an 
essential part of the monitoring procedure.
1 INTRODUCTION
Operational services that use speaker verification for secure 
access have already been predicted for at least a decade, but few 
successful large-scale telecommunication services have yet 
materialised. Field tests in the European LE projects CAVE [1] 
and Picasso [2] show that there is still a significant performance 
gap between operational services and controlled experiments on 
pre-recorded databases like SESP [1] (even though recorded in 
real life conditions). Part of the performance problems is due to 
the failure of the human computer dialog to elicit the speech 
material needed by the system. Pre-recorded databases seldom 
contain such ‘invalid’ utterances, and certainly not in the subset 
destined for model enrolment. In an operational service the risk 
of non-compliant user behaviour is largest during the first inter­
actions with a system. Experience shows that clients tend to stop 
using a service when they experience problems [3]. The aim of 
the paper is to test the feasibility of an on-line monitoring pro­
cedure that can indicate potential problems early enough to 
allow successful corrective measures to be taken. A newly de­
veloped enrolment procedure, that is able to flag potentially 
poor speaker models is an essential part of the procedure.
In 1999, KPN ran a one-year field test with the speech secured 
Free Access to Directory Assistance (FADA) service [3]. This 
service allowed authorised visually impaired customers to use 
the operator based directory assistance service for free. A help­
desk was set up for the clients that they could contact in case of 
problems. After three months an evaluation was carried out 
based on the recorded dialogs. This showed that the enrolment 
into the service already caused problems, mainly related to the
failure of the callers to adhere to the (tacit) expectations of the 
system (e.g. the need to complete the digit sequence in the re­
quired time slot) and partly to system errors. About 16% of the 
clients failed to complete the required two successful calls for 
enrolment and stopped using the service. These clients did not 
contact the helpdesk, although they had serious problems using 
the service. Apparently, the help desk should be more pro­
active: if  ‘common’ problems are detected, the help desk should 
contact the clients to assist them in the proper use of the service.
The overall analysis of access calls showed that the false reject 
rate for individual clients were very high for a substantial pro­
portion of the callers [4], [5]. It turned out that these errors were 
related to the quality of the speaker models after enrolment [6]. 
This model quality is strongly dependent on consistent behav­
iour of the user during enrolment. A measurement of the model 
quality thus yields input to the monitoring process to prevent 
individual performance problems due to low quality models.
This paper reports on an experiment with on-line monitoring in 
a telephone based speech driven investment game. The next 
section presents the service, the monitoring and the model qual­
ity assessment. Section 3 presents the results of the field test, 
followed by the discussion and conclusions in Sections 4 and 5.
2 METHODS
This section describes the speech driven investment game, the 
monitoring process and the model quality check. Finally, the 
design and implementation of the field test are described.
2.1 Investment game
The application was a speech-driven investment game, that 
allowed the participants to obtain the latest stock information, 
trade stocks and enquire about game scores. The game had an 
on-line connection to the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The task 
of the participants was to maximize the value of their portfolio 
by selling and buying stock through the SV secured system.
The speaker verification and recognition engine used was the 
Vocalis system, an improved version of the one used in the 
FADA service [9]. The callers had to identify themselves by 
saying a seven-digit account number, on which the verification 
was carried out as well. As an additional security measure cus­
tomers calling from the fixed network had to say a five-digit 
PIN-code. Mobile users could only use the service with their 
private handset, so that calling line identification (CLI) infor­
mation could be used as an extra security check. To increase
ASR robustness an error correction mechanism was used which 
allowed for one wrongly recognised digit in the account num­
ber.
The first five valid calls (i.e. providing a correct PIN/CLI and 
account number) were used for enrolment. The enrolment and 
access dialogs comprised the same prompts to the user (Figure 
1). The speaker independent verification threshold was set to 
minimise the false accepts with an acceptable amount of false 
rejects, based on the results of an off-line test with comparable 
data. When recognition mistakes were made or the customer 
was rejected due to verification, he/she received a maximum of 
two additional attempts within one call to access the service.
Figure 1: Flow of the identification/authentication sub-dialog of 
the investment game application. The left part shows the dialog 
for enrolment, the right part for the speech-secured access (after 
the model was trained).
2.2 Monitoring
The monitoring process comprised three levels in which system 
log data were converted into signs of potentially erroneous sys­
tem behaviour. The different levels were:
logging: All system events like dialog turns, customer database 
query results, system errors, and outputs from ASR and SV 
were stored in a database. All events were tagged with a unique 
dialog identity string. Each dialog was also labelled by the user 
ID of the client, derived from the speech recognition results or 
the CLI. If  multiple account numbers were recognised without 
granting access, the user ID was set to “unclear”.
interpretation: The raw logging data were analysed to detect 
problem situations. Database queries for certain system events 
(e.g. caller rejected) can yield indications of recurrent problems 
for individual clients. The queries were designed with the most 
common problem observed in the FADA field tests in mind. If 
the proportion of problematic calls exceeded a pre-defined 
threshold, the client was marked as “to be checked” (e.g. multi­
ple rejects might indicate a bad model quality or inappropriate 
usage of the service).
action list generation: To solve the problems signalled on the 
interpretation level, a number of observation-action rules were 
formulated. The actions are either diagnostic, to check the exact 
nature of the error (e.g. are the rejects true or false) or aimed at 
solving the problem. If necessary, clients can be contacted and
instructed to adapt their behaviour to match the system’s ex­
pectations (e.g. “please speak after the beep”).
All three levels were active on-line. As soon as a dialog was 
finished, all dialog events were added to the database and the 
calculations for the problem levels were carried out. Several 
examples where this monitoring was beneficial will be pre­
sented in Section 3.2 and 3.4.
2.3 Model quality check
In the FADA service it appeared that for too large a group of 
speakers the false reject rates were unacceptable [6]. In [7] it 
was shown that careful selection of the enrolment material im­
proves the model quality and therewith overall system perform­
ance. In the present system a leave-one-out method was imple­
mented that should yield optimal models and at the same time 
flag potentially weak models.
The leave-one-out method requires N  utterances of which N-1 
are used to train the model. The remaining utterance is tested 
against the model, yielding a SV score S. Scores below a certain 
threshold indicate a good match between the model and the 
utterance. This training and testing is done for each of the N  
possible permutations yielding N  scores. The model that yields 
the highest score Si on the test utterance is the model with the 
most consistent utterances. If  one or more scores Si exceed the 
threshold, because utterance(s) i do not closely match the 
model, the trained model is assigned a ‘low quality’ tag and the 
corresponding utterances are tagged as ‘outliers’.
The output of the leave-one-out (number of outliers and the 
verification score(s)) was used as extra input for the monitoring. 
In the case of one or more outliers the speech data were checked 
manually to decide if impostor material was involved or other 
factors that led to the inconsistency. Results of the leave-one- 
out algorithm are presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
2.4 Field Test
With the game a field test was carried out which lasted five 
weeks. The participants were all high-educated employees of a 
financial institution. The group was divided in mobile users who 
could only access their account by their own mobile phone and 
users who could use (mainly) a fixed line telephone. A pro­
active helpdesk was set up that, besides receiving feedback and 
error reports from users, actively motivated clients to call the 
service regularly and provided clients with feedback on their 
problems reported including hints to adapt their user behaviour.
When the test was completed, the participants were asked to fill 
in a questionnaire in which they were asked about several as­
pects of the test, the technology used and the possible service 
opportunities. In order to establish a False Accept rate for the 
system (where an impostor is granted access) 15 new partici­
pants were invited to make controlled impostor attempts at the 
end of the field test.
3 RESULTS
109 customers called the service at least once. 20 customers 
(18%) were given mobile accounts. A total number of 2662
calls were made to the system, 30% of which came from mobile 
users. Thus, the mobile users are slightly over-represented. 
However, no significant performance differences were found 
between mobile and fixed network users. 113 calls (4%) had 
unclear identity (i.e. in one call more than one attempt was 
made to enter the account number and different numbers were 
recognised each time). The number of calls per user ranged 
from 1 to 192, with an average of 22 calls. The record number 
of 192 calls came from a mobile client.
Impostor attempts were performed on the accounts for which a 
sufficient number of calls were made by the true client. A total 
of 1230 impostor verification attempts were made for 50 ac­
counts.
The remainder of this section presents the results for different 
aspects of the trial. Table 1 summarizes the results.
3.1 Field test monitoring
During the field test the monitoring relied on human supervision 
to take actions in case of problems. On a daily basis an over­
view of the system events was generated. It was formatted in 
such a way that it was easy to see the performance for individ­
ual clients. Clients for whom the FR rate exceeded 10% of a 
sufficiently large number of calls were marked as “suspicious”. 
For these clients the recordings of the enrolment and access 
utterances, and occasionally also the SV scores, were checked. 
The helpdesk reported problems detected by customers, which 
were then analyzed using the reports generated by the monitor­
ing procedure. This way, new observation-action rules evolved 
(e.g. “check immediately with the client if  the mobile CLI does 
not correspond to the account number”).
3.2 Enrolment
In the enrolment phase, a dozen callers failed to obtain access 
because the system recognized digit strings that did not match 
the existing account numbers. Listening to the files revealed that 
the customers confused the account number and the PIN. So it 
turns out that even highly educated users may fail to read or 
comprehend the instructions from the service provider [3]. A 
single round of active feedback to the customers by the help 
desk alleviated the problem.
98 of the 109 participants made at least five valid calls (where 
the identity of the caller was established with certainty) which 
means that for 89% of the callers a model was trained. Thus,
despite our attempts to be as pro-active as possible, still 11% of 
the first time customers stopped using the service at the initial 
stage.
3.3 Model quality
The leave-one-out strategy signaled potential problems for 18 
models (18%). For these questionable models one of the five 
utterances (in one case two and in one case three) received an 
outlier tag (the verification score for this utterance was higher 
than the threshold). These cases were analyzed by listening to 
the in total 21 outliers as well as the remaining enrolment utter­
ances. In two cases an utterance with extra non-digit (back­
ground) speech was left out of the model, in another it was an 
utterance made clearly by an impostor speaker. The remaining
18 outliers had several different caused: poor or inconsistent 
quality of the telephone line (6), different speaking tempo (4) 
and different pause locations (8) in the digit string between en­
rolment and access. The last two causes were due to the fact that 
those users adapted their behaviour (i.e. speaking in a more 
natural way), as they became more familiar with the system.
3.4 Verification - False Rejects
In 58 of the 2587 calls the customers were refused access as the 
speaker verification rejected them in the third access attempt 
within the same dialog. Auditory comparison of the speech files 
with other files of the same client showed that 55 were False 
Rejects (FR), giving a 2% False Reject rate on dialog level.
19 clients (19%) were responsible for all FR’s. For the clients 
who called more than 20 times FR rates ranged from 1-10%. 
The large range in individual false reject rates suggest that the 
majority of the problems is due to user behaviour rather than 
failures of the system. Two clients encountered FR rates ex­
ceeding 10%. One of them tried to test the system for its robust­
ness (e.g. by making hands free calls while driving at high 
speed). Inspection of the data of the other client showed that the 
rejects could not be explained. For both customers the verifica­
tion thresholds were slightly increased to reduce the chance of 
future FRs. By the end of the field test, their individual FR rate 
had decreased below 10%. However, the “test driver” still 
caused 19 (35%) of all false rejects.
After listening to the remaining 36 rejected utterances it ap­
peared that about 30% were probably due to background noise. 
About another 30% were due to varying speaking tempo and 
pauses made at different locations in the digit string than in the 
enrolment utterances. Another 30% rejects were due to poor line 
quality, sudden changes of the volume in an utterance, or back­
ground speech. The remaining 10% could not be explained.
Since we were interested in the extent to which FRs can be pre­
dicted by the model quality, the rejected utterances were related 
to their speakers’ model information. It appeared that 64% of 
the FRs were associated with “low quality” models. Of the 
speakers who encountered FRs 8 (42%) had poor quality mod­
els.
Number % of total
Customers 109
Enrolled customers 98 89%
Low quality models 18 18%
Calls 2587
False Rejects 55 2%
Impostor calls 1230
False Accepts 7 0.6%
Table 1: Overall results from the field test.
3.5 Verification -  False Accepts
In only 7 (0.6%) of the 1230 impostor attempts the system 
granted access to the caller. The leave-one-out enrolment algo­
rithm does not involve tests of the model with (pseudo) impos­
tor utterances (as did [6] and [7]). Thus, no relation with the 
model quality flag can be expected. The difference in FA and 
FR rates corresponds to the off-line optimization of the thresh­
old before the field test. Setting the threshold gives the service 
provider the freedom to choose the balance between FR and FR 
rates which is most appropriate for the application.
3.6 Subjective Evaluation
98 of the 109 clients filled in the questionnaire. They were very 
pleased with the service, rating it with an 8 on a scale from 1 to 
10. They preferred a combination of a PIN code and SV to SV 
only. They also suggested many opportunities for speech-se­
cured services in the financial sector. In addition 92% of the 
participants would desire a real operator to backup the system in 
case of problems. The clients who did not complete the first five 
calls mentioned lack of time to as the major reason for aban­
doning the game. When interpreting the results of the question­
naire one should keep in mind that the application did not in­
volve real money.
4 DISCUSSION
The results of our experiment show that on-line monitoring of 
an SV service is feasible and valuable. By keeping track of the 
performance of individual clients problems could be diagnosed 
early enough to take corrective measures. Pro-active monitoring 
also solved the problems some clients had with the instructions. 
Using the model quality flag as an extra indication of potential 
problems helped to speed up the diagnosis of FRs.
The question remains, however, how to standardise the actions 
initiated by the warning flags generated by the monitoring. An 
example is the sort of action that should be undertaken, either in 
case of a “low quality” flag or of a high proportion of rejects. 
Currently only the enrolment and access utterances are checked 
and the threshold can be adapted manually. An alternative ac­
tion could be re-training of the model with new utterances or 
continuous unsupervised adaptation of the speaker model. Ex­
periments in [8] showed, however, that the success of adaptation 
depends on the quality of the initial models.
From the questionnaire it appears that clients would like to have 
operator fall-back. If  a client is rejected, an operator can still 
grant access based on additional information. They can also 
provide extra feedback or instructions, and in this way prevent 
the customer from stopping to use the service. This is similar to 
the use of SV in the Home Shopping Network service [10].
The model quality measure implemented in the current system 
is a good initial indicator of the possible problems for low- 
quality models. At the same time, however, a large number of 
false alarms are generated. Many models evaluated as poor do 
fine during verification. The risk of this method is that outlier 
tags are attached to incidental poor quality utterances where the 
rest of the utterances contributing to the model are fine. In this
way the aim of obtaining better quality models is still achieved 
as the low quality utterance is left out, but the whole model 
receives unjustly a low quality tag.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Real-time monitoring as proposed in this article increases the 
usability of an operational speaker verification service and 
guarantees the required minimal level of performance. Together 
with the model quality check it leads to a lower number of False 
Rejects as the signalled problems can be diagnosed and resolved 
in a short span of time. Both these mechanisms contribute sig­
nificantly to the preservation and satisfaction of customers.
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